Rugby Public LLC, Jerald Sarfolean v. Department of Alcohol Beverage Control, State of Utah : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Rugby Public LLC, Jerald Sarfolean v. Department
of Alcohol Beverage Control, State of Utah : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas A. Gubler; Joseph L. Anderson.
Brent A. Burnett; Assistant Attorney General; Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General.
DOUGLAS A. GUBLER 4659 S. Highland Dr. Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 JOSEPH L.
ANDERSON 322 University St. #4 Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 Attorneys for Petitioners-Appe!!~-*-
BRENT A. BUvi^TT (4003) Assistant Attorney General 160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor P. O. Box
140858 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 Telephone: (801) 366-0533 Attorney for Respondent/
Appellee
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Rugby Public LLC v. Department of Alcohol Beverage Control, No. 20070955 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/594
[N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RUGBY PUB LLC and JERALD : 
SARFOLEAN, 
Petitioners - Appellants, 
v. Case No. 20070955-CA 
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL BEVERAGE 
CONTROL, STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent - Appell^ : 
BRIEF OF RESPONuiu> f - APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Judee Glenn K. Iwasaki 
BRENT A. BUvi^TT (4003) 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 140858 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 
Telephone: (801) 366-0533 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
DOUGLAS A. GUBLER 
4659 S. Highland Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
JOSEPH L. ANDERSON 
322 University St. #4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Petitioners-Appe!!~-*-
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT 
REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT - APPELLEE 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RUGBY PUB LLC and JERALD : 
SARFOLEAN, 
Petitioners - Appellants, 
v. Case No. 20070955-CA 
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL BEVERAGE 
CONTROL, STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent - Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
BRENT A. BURNETT (4003) 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 140858 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 
Telephone: (801) 366-0533 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
DOUGLAS A. GUBLER 
4659 S. Highland Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
JOSEPH L. ANDERSON 
322 University St. #4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Petitioners-Appellants 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT 
REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT - APPELLEE 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
To the best of Respondent's/Appellee's knowledge, all interested parties appear in 
the caption of this Brief. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. PETITIONERS CANNOT RAISE OPEN COURT AND DUE PROCESS 
CLAIMS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 5 
II. THE APRIL 27, 2007 ORDER OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 8 
CONCLUSION 12 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 13 
Addendum A - Determinative Statutes and Rules 
Addendum B - Memorandum Decision (R. 171-75) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Serv.. 2007 UT App 280. 167 P.3d 1102 8 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987) 7 
CSRBv. Dep't of Corr.. 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997) 11 
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ. 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990) 6 
Hiltslev v. Ryder. 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987) 7 
Kirk v. Div. of Occupational and Prof 1 Licensing. 815 P.2d 242 (Utah App. 1991) 2 
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson. 2004 UT 14, 86 P.3d 735 7 
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) 7 
State v. Hen-era. 1999 UT 64, 993 P.2d 854 7 
State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992) 6 
Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17 8, 9, 10 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-10-206 (West Supp. 2007) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (West 2004) 8 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-101 to -601 (Westlaw, 2008 Laws of Utah, Chapter 382) . . . 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (Westlaw, 2008 Laws of Utah, Chapter 3) 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RUGBY PUB LLC and JERALD : 
SARFOLEAN, 
Petitioners/Appellants, 
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Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (Westlaw, 2008 Laws of Utah, Chapter 3). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. On appeal, petitioners raise claims that the district court's decision violated 
their rights under the open courts and due process provisions of Utah's Constitution and 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
These issues were not raised in the district court and cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was not raised below and was not 
considered by the district court. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to this Court and does not 
entail review of the district court's decision. 
2. Judge Iwasaki correctly ruled that the Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Commission's Order of April 27, 2007 was a final administrative order. It constituted 
final agency action from which judicial review could be sought. The petitioners did not 
bring their petition for judicial review until July 27, 2007. Because the petition was filed 
more than thirty days after the entry of the final agency action, the district court was 
without jurisdiction to consider the petitioners' untimely petition 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by the respondent's 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R. 44-70, 158-60) and was the basis for the 
district court's ruling. R. 171-75. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court was called upon to review the 
decision reached in an informal administrative proceeding by trial de novo. On appeal 
this Court reviews the district court's conclusions of law for correction of error. Kirk v. 
Div. of Occupational and Prof 1 Licensing. 815 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control brought an administrative 
proceeding against Rugby Pub and Jerald Sarafolean for violations of the Utah Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act. R. 115-23. An evidentiary hearing was held on January 31, 2007. 
2 
Based on the evidence presented, the hearing officer entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Action on February 26, 2007. R. 20-29. The 
hearing officer recommended that the petitioners be assessed fines and administrative 
costs totaling $1,168.33. R. 27-28. 
At its April 27, 2007 meeting, the Commission adopted the hearing officer's 
findings and conclusions. R. 15-16. The Commission's Order of April 27, 2007, 
required the petitioners to pay the fines and costs no later than May 15, 2007. Failure to 
pay by June 14, 2007 would result in the fines and costs being recovered from the Rugby 
Pub's compliance bond. R. 16. The Commission's Order informed the petitioners 
(respondents in the administrative proceeding) of their right to seek judicial review in the 
district court within thirty days. IdL The petitioners did not seek review of this order. 
When the petitioners failed to pay the fines and costs, an Order to Show Cause was 
issue by the Commission on June 18, 2007. R. 13. When the fines and costs had still not 
been paid by the Commission's meeting on June 29, 2007, the Commission ordered the 
compliance bond forfeited as it had stated in its original order (April 27, 2007). R. 61. 
Rugby Pub and Jerald Sarafolean filed their petition for judicial review on July 27, 
2007. R. 1-6. Petitioners asked the district court to set aside the Commission's Order 
assessing fees and costs as part of the relief sought. R. 3. Respondent filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. R. 44-70, 158-60. In opposing this motion, the 
petitioners argued that the April 27, 2007 order was not a final order and that the 
3 
Commission did not have the authority to order the bond revoked in these circumstances. 
R. 108-12. No constitutional claims were raised. 
Petitioners also filed a motion for partial summary judgment. R. 71-105, 163-66. 
In their motion, petitioners also argued that the Commission did not have the authority to 
impose the fines and costs set out in the April 27 order. 
In its memorandum decision of November 1, 2007, the district court held that the 
Commission's Order of April 27 constituted final agency action and that the petition for 
judicial relief was untimely. The court therefore dismissed the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction. R. 171-75. 
The petitioners filed their notice of appeal on December 3, 2007. R. 176-77. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are taken from the findings of fact made by the hearing officer 
and adopted in whole by the Commission. R. 15, 21-24. The petitioners have not 
challenged the facts found by the Commission. 
Jerald Sarafolean is the owner of the Rugby and also an employee. R. 22 ^|2. On 
November 22, 2006, Mr. Sarafolean served free beer to two undercover officers. R. 23-
24. This is a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 32 A-10-206(5) (West Supp. 2007) 
(prohibiting the sale of beer at less than cost or offering free alcoholic beverages to the 
general public). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In their opening brief, petitioners raise two constitutional claims. They claim their 
open courts and due process rights were violated. But these issues were not raised below. 
They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The only mention of due process rights 
in the district court related to a nonparty. This action cannot be used to determine the 
rights of a nonparty. Nor do the petitioners have standing to raise the claims of third 
persons. 
On April 27, 2007, the Commission entered its final agency action. In that order 
the Commission found that the petitioners had violated Utah law. The Commission 
imposed sanctions for those violations, and stated how the fines and costs imposed should 
be satisfied if the petitioners failed to voluntarily comply. Petitioners did not seek 
judicial review. They cannot now seek such review by means of challenging a later 
enforcement proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONERS CANNOT RAISE OPEN COURT AND DUE 
PROCESS CLAIMS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Petitioner's opening brief seeks to raise constitutional claims that were not 
presented to the district court. At no time did the petitioners argue before Judge Iwasaki 
that their rights under the open courts provision of the Utah State Constitution would be 
violated if he ruled that their petition for judicial review was untimely. At no time did 
5 
they argue before Judge Iwasaki that such a ruling would violate their rights to due 
process.1 
In Rspinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ. 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990), the plaintiffs 
raised a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal. In refusing to consider that 
claim, the Utah Supreme Court explained that: 
Appellants' first claim is that the realignment violated article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution by denying them the liberty to control their children's 
education. This claim was raised for the first time on appeal. With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this Court has been to decline consideration of 
issues raised for the first time on appeal. We therefore do not address this 
claim. 
Id. at 413 (citations omitted). The limited exceptions to this general rule deal with cases 
in which the appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court committed plain error or 
exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 
(Utah App. 1992) (footnote omitted). 
It was the duty of the petitioners to raise any constitutional claims in the district 
court. This would have permitted Judge Iwasaki to consider these issues. Petitioners 
cannot challenge the district court's decision based on claims that were never raised 
below. This is especially true where petitioners have not briefed the question of whether 
plain error or other exceptional circumstances might exist that could lead this Court to 
1
 Open courts was never mentioned in the district court. The only mention by the 
petitioners of due process rights was in oral argument, and then only in connection with 
the alleged rights of Thomas Sarafolean, who is not a party to this action. R. 182 at 13, 
17&21. 
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consider this issue for the first time on appeal. Where the petitioners did not analyze an 
issue in their opening brief, this Court will not review that issue. State v. Brown. 853 
P.2d851,854n.l (Utah 1992). 
The only due process claim raised below was on behalf of Thomas Sarafolean. 
But he was never a party to this action. The district court could not adjudicate the rights 
of a nonparty. 
This rule is consistent with the general principle that a trial court 
may not render judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can generally make 
a legally binding adjudication only between the parties actually joined in 
the action. 
Hiltslev v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987) (reversing judgment in favor of an 
estate that was not a party to the action). See also Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 
1263 (Utah 1987) ("A court may not grant relief to a nonparty."). 
Nor do the petitioners have standing to claim that a nonparty's rights have been 
violated. "[A] party may generally assert only his or her own rights and cannot raise the 
claims of third parties who are not before the court." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 
2004 UT 14,1J9, 86 P.3d 735. See also State v. Herrera. 1999 UT 64, ^42, 993 P.2d 854 
("We have long held that one 'may not allege jeopardy or injury to others in order to 
confer standing upon his own claims."'). Having failed to raise in the district court any 
claim that their rights to due process were violated, the petitioners do not have standing to 
raise a claim that a nonparty's right to due process has been violated. 
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II THE APRIL 27, 2007 ORDER OF THE COMMISSION 
CONSTITUTED FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
In its order of April 27, 2007, the Commission adopted the Hearing Officer's 
findings and conclusions that the petitioners had violated Utah's statutory prohibition 
against offering free alcoholic beverages to the general public. It also imposed the 
recommended fines and costs totaling $1,168.33 against the petitioners. The Commission 
also determined that the fines and costs would be paid by the petitioners' compliance 
bond if not voluntarily paid before June 14, 2007.2 R. 15-16. The order also informed the 
petitioners of their right to seek judicial review within thirty days from the date of the 
order. R. 16. The petitioners did not seek judicial review until July 27, 2007, well after 
the thirty-day period had run. 
A petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty days of the date of the 
order that constitutes final agency action. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (West 
2004).3 The timely filing of a petition for judicial review, like the timely filing of a notice 
of appeal, is jurisdictional. Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Serv., 2007 UT App 280, T|7, 
167 P.3d 1102. See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT 40,%13 
999 P.2d 17 (petitions filed after the thirty-day period fail to give courts jurisdiction to 
2
 Thirty days after the May 15, 2007 deadline for payment set by the Commission. 
3
 Utah's Administrative Procedure Act has since been renumbered, though the 
pertinent language of the statutes has not been changed. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-101 
to -601 (Westlaw, 2008 Laws of Utah, Chapter 382). 
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review administrative decisions). Petitioners sought to avoid the consequences of their 
untimely petition by claiming that the Commission's order was not a final agency action. 
The April 27, 2007 Order constituted the final agency action by the Commission. 
The Commission made a final determination as to whether the petitioners violated Utah's 
law. The Commission made a final determination as to what penalty and costs should be 
imposed for the violation. The Commission also made a final determination as to how to 
enforce its decision if the petitioners failed to voluntarily pay the fines and costs imposed 
by the order. Nothing was left for the Commission to do. The challenged order resolved 
all issues before the Commission. 
In Union Pacific, the court set out factors to be considered in deciding if an 
administrative order qualifies as final agency action. 
(1) Has administrative decisionmaking reached a stage where judicial 
review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?; 
(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal consequences 
flow from the agency action?; and 
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary, preparatory, 
procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency action? 
Union Pacific, 2000 UT 40 at U16. 
Every element of this test was met by the April 27, 2007 Order. That order found 
that the petitioners had violated Utah law and assessed the sanction to be imposed. No 
further administrative action was necessary on this issue. Judicial review would not 
disrupt the administrative adjudication because the final decision had been reached. The 
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same is true of the decision on how the order would be enforced (forfeiture of the bond if 
the petitioners did not voluntarily pay). 
The April 27, 2007 Order also determined the rights of the parties and the legal 
consequences that would flow from its decision. No further administrative proceedings 
have been necessary to make such determinations. 
Nor was the April 27, 2007 Order "preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or 
intermediate." Examples of such orders are "orders remanding the case for further 
proceedings, converting informal proceedings into formal ones, and denying motions to 
dismiss." Id. at ^[21. Unlike the examples used by the court in Union Pacific, the 
Commission's order made final findings and conclusions as to the rights of the parties and 
what sanctions would be imposed. Final decisions made on the merits of the charges 
against the petitioners, and what penalty should be imposed, are not preliminary, 
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate. The petitioners have failed to identify any 
further actions that were needed after the April 27, 2007 Order other than for it to be 
enforced. It met the third test for being a final agency action. 
The April 27, 2007 Order was the final agency action and the petitioners' time for 
filing for judicial review ran from its entry. The order to show cause dated June 29, 2007 
was not a final agency action. R. 61. It did not determine whether the petitioners had 
violated Utah law. It did not establish what sanction, if any, should be imposed on the 
petitioners. It was an effort to enforce the final agency action that had been entered in 
April. Petitioners cannot circumvent their failure to seek review from the final agency 
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action by raising their challenges to a separate enforcement proceeding. CSRB v. Dep't 
ofCom, 942 P.2d 933, 939 (Utah 1997). 
In CSRB, the Department of Corrections had failed to seek judicial review from 
the final agency action, but had also failed to comply with the CSRB's order. The 
Department then sought to challenge the final agency action when the CSRB brought a 
civil enforcement proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-19 (West 2004). 
While agency actions such as the Board's adjudication of Parker's grievance 
may be continued in the civil court system by filing an appeal in the Utah 
Court of Appeals, see §§ 63-46b-14, -16, an action seeking enforcement of 
a final order is not a continuation of the grievance. Corrections declined its 
opportunity to appeal and cannot now successfully argue that the Parker 
grievance is still pending. The fact that agencies may seek enforcement of 
their orders against recalcitrant parties in the civil courts does not mean that 
their decisions are not final until enforced by the courts. The enforcement 
action before us now is not a continuation of the former administrative 
adjudication, but a separate action to enforce the order in Parker's grievance 
proceeding. 
14 
Ongoing enforcement proceedings, such as the June 29, 2007 order, are not 
continuations of the administrative proceeding that concluded with the final agency action 
entered in April, 2007. The Commission's efforts to enforce its order are similar to 
supplemental proceedings that seek to enforce a civil judicial judgment. Neither affects 
the finality of the orders that they seek to implement. The district court correctly rejected 
the petitioners' efforts to extend the time in which to challenge the final agency action by 
using the enforcement actions brought about by their failure to comply. 
11 
In the instant [case], Petitioners were ordered, on April 27, 2007, to 
pay certain fines and costs assessed against them. Their failure to pay such 
fines in compliance with the order necessitated an order to show cause. 
This order to show cause, however, falls outside the administrative 
procedures act and cannot be utilized to extend the time for appeal. Indeed, 
permitting such extensions would, in effect, condone noncompliance with 
the Commission's final order of April 27, 2007. 
R. 173. 
The district court correctly dismissed this action for lack of jurisdiction. That 
decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue before this Court is whether the district court had jurisdiction to 
hear this petition for judicial review. For the above stated reasons, respondent asks this 
Court to affirm the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
petitioner's untimely appeal. 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Respondent-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in 
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal are such that respondent believes oral 
argument will not be of assistance to the Court in reviewing and deciding this matter. 
Respondent does desire to participate in oral argument if such is held by the Court. 
12 
V 
Respectfully submitted this 7-3 day of May, 2008. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent - Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent - Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this Z.J day of May, 
2008: 
DOUGLAS A. GUBLER 
4659 S. Highland Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
JOSEPH L. ANDERSON 
322 University St. #4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Petitioners-Appellants 
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ADDENDUM "A 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (West 2004). 
Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in actions 
where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this 
chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any 
or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public 
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 
days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents 
and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
ADDENDUM "B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RUGBY PUB, LLC a n d JERALD 
SARAFOLEAN, 
P e t i t i o n e r s , 
v s 
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL BEVERAGE 
CONTROL, STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. -0709010€«9. Q ^ Q ^ X Q ^ l s A 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
FILED DISTRICT COUBT 
O c t o b e r 2 9 , 2 0tfRjrd judicial District 
Deputy Clerk 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 
Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court 
heard oral argument with respect to the motions on October 29, 
2007. Following the hearing, the matters were taken under 
advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions and memoranda and 
for the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
Turning initially to the motion to dismiss, Respondent notes 
that Petitioners filed a Complaint with this Court seeking 
judicial review of the Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Commission's Order dated June 29, 2007, directing the Rugby Pub's 
"on Premise Beer Bond" filed with the Department be forfeited to 
pay fines and costs owed to the Department, pursuant to the 
Commission's April 27, 2007 decision and order on a licensing 
1 — 1 I 
RUGBY PUB v. DABC Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
violation action against Petitioners. According to the 
Department, the Court must dismiss Petitioners' Complaint because 
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as Petitioners' 
attempt of judicial review is untimely. Specifically, argues the 
Department, Petitioners were required to file their Complaint 
within the thirty days following the April 27, 2007 Commission 
Order, which would be May 27, 2007. 
Respondent contends state law is clear that petitioners are 
only entitled to "one bite at the apple" on reconsideration. 
Therefore, argues Respondent, since Petitioners did not file any 
challenge to the order, including the penalty, until July 31, 
2007, it is necessary and in the interest of justice to dismiss 
the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 
In opposition to the motion, Petitioner contends a 
subsequent order was made on June 29, 2007 and Petitioners timely 
appealed that order on July 27, 2007, less than thirty days from 
the final order issued by the Commission. Indeed, argue 
Petitioners, following the hearing on Respondent's motion for 
order to show cause, it was determined and ordered that there 
were grounds to forfeit Petitioners' compliance bond. According 
to Petitioners, the issue before the Court is what "constitutes 
final agency action" for purposes of filing an appeal. In this 
case, contend Petitioners, it is clear that the order issued by 
RUGBY PUB v. DABC Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the Commission on April 27, 2007 was not final in that it was 
merely a preparatory or an intermediate order that required an 
order to show cause to determine whether the compliance bond 
could be forfeited. Thereafter, assert Petitioners, a hearing 
was held in which it was determined that the compliance bond 
could be forfeited. Petitioners disagreed with such decision and 
filed this appeal. Finally, assert Petitioners, Rule 81 does not 
provide for any fine unless it is in conjunction with revocation 
or suspension of a license and in this case, Petitioners7 license 
was never revoked. 
In the instant, Petitioners were ordered, on April 27, 2007, 
to pay certain fines and costs assessed against them. Their 
failure to pay such fines in compliance with the order 
necessitated an order to show cause. This order to show cause, 
however, falls outside the administrative procedures act and 
cannot be utilized to extend the time for appeal. Indeed, 
permitting such extensions would, in effect, condone 
noncompliance with the Commission's final order of April 27, 
2007. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court finds it lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the matter and, accordingly, grants 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Indeed, while Petitioners' 
claims may have merit, the Court does not reach their motion as 
1-13. 
RUGBY PUB v. DABC Page 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
such is procedurally barred due to the untimely filing of the 
Complaint. 
DATED this * day of Gtrtrcfo^ r, 2007. 
\ —-i y \ 
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